Lessons of war – I

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The decade-long conflict needs to be seriously analyzed in order to draw objective lessons that could be invaluable in developing our national security doctrine

The experiences and lessons of war that a nation experiences in the course of its history can be a major source of knowledge for developing a coherent national security doctrine or strategy.

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Without such a doctrine, a nation cannot expect to secure and promote its national interests – be it territorial, economic, social or political. But the lessons to be derived from history needs to be accurate and relevant to the present an future security environments as they relate to national interests. Indifference to or application of wrong lessons derived from history (World War I ) resulted in disastrous consequence for a number of major countries in World War II.

The decade-long armed conflict that Nepal faced needs to be seriously investigated an analyzed especially by strategic institutions and academies in order to draw objective lessons that could be invaluable in developing our national security doctrine on which the survival and growth of Nepal as an independent nation-state depends.

Moreover, the celebration of Army Day on the auspicious day of Maha Shavaratri will be truly meaningful if the Nepalese as a whole and the Nepal Army (NA) in particular sincerely try to learn from this momentous historical event.

The most important lesson to be learned, perhaps , is the bitter truth that civil war is too costly in terms of men, material, money, mental agony and time. Approximately 15,000 Nepalese including 905 Royal Nepal Army (RNA) soldiers, 1,479 policemen, 303 Armed Police Force personnel, 21 National Investigation Department personnel, and more than 8,077 Maoist cares sacrificed their lives in this wild fire. Moreover, the civil war devastated our physical infrastructure worth several trillion rupees, displaced several hundred thousand people and delayed development projects for many years. What caused this wild fire? Basically, Nepal was forced to face this civil war because successive governments in the post Jana Andolan-I period could not provide good governance and visionary leadership to sincerely and wisely lead the country.

A nation threatened from within is threatened from every possible direction. Internal instability definitely invites foreign intervention in numerous forms and colors. The civil society and even members of the political parties that signed the famous 12 point-agreement now regret that the document was rafted and signed in foreign lands. Moreover, many politicians and intellectuals, rightly or wrongly, interpret this agreement as a foreign grand strategy designed to replace the kingdom with a federated republic based on ethnicity and finally integrate the country into Akhanda Bharat.

Though it remained undefeated and intact till the last moment, the RNA happened to be a silent witness to the fall of the royal government and the century-old institution of the monarchy. The armed conflict, once, again, proved the fundamental strategic truth that even when battles are not lost, wars can be lost if the national security doctrine is not correct, and the strategic environment is not favourable. Furthermore, for the troops to give their best in a protracted battle, they should know the basic cause for which they are fighting, and the countrymen must endorse and support this cause.

The civil war, which was accompanied by all forms of human tragedies and destruction across the nation, should enlighten the Nepalese that there is no short-cut solution to an insurgency, and a military approach in isolation is not an effective option for successfully combating this problem. Proper coordination and employment of all national instruments of power under a legitimate civilian government is the only effective solution to an insurgency. Moreover, it will b every costly to defeat an insurgency if it is not properly addressed in its formative stage.

The Maoist party managed to raise the level of political consciousness of ethnic groups and marginalized people, and gave them a sense of identity and hope. It unbelievable raised, organized and sustained its political organization, militia and guerrilla army across the nation to successfully engage successive governments and the national security forces. The civil war also demonstrated the vulnerability of the Kathmandu Valley, the country’s nerve centre. And how the insurgents indigenously managed to manufacture tens of thousands of socket bombs and crude domestic weapons and made the best use of media, psychological operations and the open international border to further their grand aims should open the eyes and ears of the security forces in New Nepal.

The unfortunate Holery incident was the consequence of an ill-conceived national Security Council (NS). Unfortunately, the political parties still do not seem to be serious about establishing a balanced and practical NSC that has several important tasks including the formulation of a national security doctrine or strategy.

The takeover of state power by the king with the support of the RNA gave a drastically new twist and dimension to the insurgency. This move benefited the army counter insurgency campaign tactically, but seriously handicapped it strategically. The great questions that will haunt the Nepal Army (NA) for years to come are.: Did the king seek the advice of the RNA? Was the RNA justified in blindly supporting the king to stage this coup? Did the military top brass seriously appreciate the implications of this move before advising the king? Was the king genuinely ignorant of the limitations and capabilities of the RNA in combating insurgency inn the absence of national and international support?

The fact was that an overwhelming number of very senior military officers in key positions including retired general officers were very much aware of the disastrous implications of this fateful move. Had those officers in uniform enough moral courage to strongly convince the king about the short-sightedness of his move, history would have taken a different turn, and the RNA would not have landed on the wrong side of the historical current at the end of the day. The NA, now, must do an hones soul-searching exercise to find out why the military top brass did not have courage when it was needed most. And an armed institution like the NA can never survive the stress of war without moral courage to speak and follow the truth.

Continued…………………..